$3.4 Billion in Annual Professional Services Contracts — 90% Late

Philadelphia's $3.4B in professional services contracts are 90% finalized late; more than a quarter face 5+ month delays. Nonprofits bankroll the gap.

Stack of late municipal contracts with a past-due stamp, scattered across a worn desk.

In March, the Pew Charitable Trusts wrote about the most detailed study of Philadelphia’s contracting system I have read: Bennett Midland’s 137‑page City of Philadelphia Professional Services Conformance Reform, released in December 2025. It examined more than 12,000 professional services contracts the city signed between fiscal year 2020 and January 2025. The team interviewed over 40 city employees across 15 departments. The number that came out of it was 90 percent. 90 percent of the city’s professional services contracts are finalized after the work has already begun. More than a quarter of those face delays of five months or more. Those late contracts cover $3.4 billion a year in city money.

I want to sit with that number for a moment, because it is not a typical “Philadelphia is slow” finding. It is worse than that. It means the city is functionally operating outside its own procurement framework, every year, on more than 2,000 late contracts. 90 percent is a steady state. It is the city’s normal mode of operation. The 137 pages are largely an attempt to answer how the city got here.

What “Conformed After the Start Date” Actually Means

The technical term for a finalized contract in Philadelphia procurement is “conformed.” A contract is conformed when every required approval point has been secured and both the city and the vendor have signed: the Office of Economic Opportunity, Procurement, the Law Department, Finance and the Chief Administrative Officer all review it before it can be executed. Until that happens, the work happens on the vendor’s dime.

Pew’s summary of the report and the Philadelphia Inquirer’s coverage described the consequence plainly. In the fall of 2024, the city ran a five‑week sprint that conformed more than 550 backlogged contracts and paid down more than $221 million in outstanding invoices. Nonprofits taking out bridge loans to cover payroll. Nonprofits paying interest on those loans — interest that, by the structure of the contracts, is not reimbursable when the city eventually pays. Nonprofits missing payroll, cutting programs, turning clients away. Cynthia Figueroa, the president and CEO of JEVS Human Services, summarized it in a Philadelphia Citizen commentary in April: “90 percent of City contracts over the past five years were finalized after their start date — often requiring organizations to work for months without being paid.”

Five months of work without pay is not a paperwork delay. It is the nonprofit extending credit to the city, on the city’s terms, for the city’s convenience. The city gets the service. The nonprofit gets the risk. The interest on the bridge loan, when it shows up in the nonprofit’s books, is the cost of doing the city’s job.

The asymmetry of this is the part that should make me stop. A large consulting firm can absorb a five‑month payment delay. They have revolving credit facilities. They have retained earnings. They have lawyers on retainer who can pick up the phone and expedite the paperwork. A homeless shelter cannot. A food bank cannot. A youth program cannot. The organizations with the least ability to absorb a five‑month delay are the ones absorbing the five‑month delay. The system asks the smallest actors in the city to bankroll the largest.

Where the Delay Lands

The Pew report does not just count contracts. It counts them by department, by contract type and by value, and the category‑level finding is the opposite of what you would expect. The lateness is not concentrated anywhere. No department the report reviewed conformed more than 40 percent of its contracts before the start date, 36 of them conformed fewer than one in five on time, and the report’s own conclusion is flat: “Delays across the professional services conformance system are widespread and cannot be attributed to a single department.”

Where the report does find concentration is in volume, not lateness. Five of the seven departments with the most contracts work primarily in the human services sector. The three largest are Human Services, at 353 contracts a year, Public Health at 306, and the Office of Homeless Services at 197 — more than 850 between them. Those are the contracts that buy mental health and substance use treatment, child welfare, gun violence intervention, after‑school programs and homeless shelters. They are also the contracts the city signs most often and renews most often, because the Home Rule Charter limits the city to one‑year terms unless the City Council approves an exception.

Here is my reading, and the report does not make it: the categories that get hit hardest are not the ones with the worst conformance rates — the report says those are everywhere — but the ones where a nonprofit cannot stop working while the paperwork catches up. A homeless shelter cannot close for a week because its renewal is in review. A child welfare agency cannot stop placing children. The report is blunt about this. It cites the City Controller’s April 2024 review of the Community Expansion Grant program, which found the practice problematic and recommended the City stop asking vendors to provide services before a contract is conformed — and then says the recommendation is “unfortunately impractical,” because essential services cannot just stop. Nonprofits make up roughly 30 percent of the city’s workforce — one of the largest nonprofit employment bases in the country — and they are the ones holding the line on services the city cannot cancel.

This is what 90 percent actually means, when you pull the categories apart. It is not one broken vendor and it is not one bad department. It is a system that asks the organizations least able to wait to keep working while the paperwork catches up.

The Procurement Bottleneck

The Pew report identifies the bottleneck, and it is not paperwork. Once a contract starts moving through conformance it moves quickly: the city finalizes its most complex contracts in a median of 97 days, in line with its own goals and with federal and state practice, and the seven highest‑volume departments beat the city’s own 85‑day goal. The problem is volume and timing. The city signs nearly 2,300 professional services contracts a year, 60 percent of them routine annual renewals, and 65 percent of all contracts start their conformance journey on or after the contract’s start date, which guarantees they are late. Procurement’s problem is the same problem seen from the other end: it does the legal review on all of them. It does not have the centralized authority to push back on the departments that send it contracts late, and the report finds the city does not have the internal reporting systems that would let anyone manage the queue. The report’s finding on the department is blunt: staff describe it as a compliance enforcer rather than a problem‑solving partner, and the report calls it “a chronically understaffed department (relative to its responsibilities).” Its recommendation is to redefine and resource the department so that it leads professional services contracting instead of policing it.

This is not a surprise to anyone who has worked with the city. The Procurement Department has been aware of the problem for years. The 2024 Controller’s audit by Christy Brady looked at a related issue — the special‑exemption rule that lets departments award contracts without public bidding — and found $15 million in improperly exempt contracts and $85 million in under‑encumbered contracts in the Department of Behavioral Health and Intellectual disAbility Services. Different topic. Same pattern: departments operating outside the city’s own procurement rules, and the central procurement function not having the leverage to push back.

The Pew report’s recommendations are specific. Empower Procurement to lead the city’s professional services contracting system. Streamline the contract approval process. Build the dashboards that would let city leaders and department heads track conformance rates by department. None of these three is a moonshot, and none of them requires a new law. It requires a Mayor and a Chief Administrative Officer who decide this matters.

Who Is Accountable

The Chief Administrative Officer of Philadelphia is Camille A. Duchaussée. She is the named respondent in the Inquirer coverage, quoted as acknowledging “operational gaps” and the city’s commitment to “strengthening our contracting practices and supporting efficient, transparent and timely service delivery to Philadelphians.” That is a true statement. It is also the same statement the city has been making for years.

The Mayor is Cherelle L. Parker. Her administration has made nonprofit contracting a stated priority. Figueroa’s Philadelphia Citizen commentary, written a month after the Pew report, credited “the Mayor’s Chief Administrative Office” for “a collaboration with the nonprofit sector.” That collaboration is real. It has not changed the 90 percent.

The report does not hand the bottleneck to a person. Its finding is structural: “Currently, many actors hold distinct responsibilities and no one actor is responsible for the management and success of the overall system.” The Chief Administrative Officer, the Law Department and Procurement each hold a piece of the conformance process, and the report concludes that none of them is currently structured and resourced to lead the whole thing. The Procurement Commissioner is named in the report — Ronald Hovey, who sat on the City Contracting Working Group that shaped it — and the report still does not attribute the 90 percent to him.

The Cost of Doing Nothing

The Pew report did not put a single dollar figure on the cost of the 90 percent. It identified the components: interest on bridge loans. Programs cut because reserves were depleted. Staff turnover because payroll was unreliable. The pattern is consistent enough that I think the most honest read is that every dollar of un‑reimbursable interest paid by a Philadelphia nonprofit on a bridge loan to cover a delayed city contract is a tax levied by the city on the nonprofit. The cost is not borne by the city. The cost is borne by the people who need the services — the kids whose after‑school program missed the first month of the school year, the families whose food bank cut deliveries, the people a homeless shelter could not take in because extending credit to the city had eaten its reserves.

What the 90 Percent Really Is

Philadelphia is not unusual among large American cities. Like many other jurisdictions, it leans on outside organizations to run core services and struggles with a procurement system that is slow and complicated to navigate. Bennett Midland, the New York‑based civic consulting firm that works with cities on procurement reform, wrote the report for Pew. What the report does not do is put Philadelphia’s delay rate next to other cities’. Its conclusion is more useful than a league table: the delay is not a Philadelphia pathology. It is what happens when a city signs nearly 2,300 professional services contracts a year, 60 percent of them one‑year renewals, and starts 65 percent of them through conformance on or after the day the work is supposed to begin. The 137 pages are an attempt to answer the question of how the city got here.

The report does not have a clean answer. The Pew team reviewed five and a half years of contracting data. My reading is that the system is the result of a thousand small decisions — to under‑resource Procurement, to push conformance to the back of departmental priority lists, to treat the bridge loan interest as a “cost of doing business” the city does not have to count — that compound into a 90 percent failure rate on contracts the city has explicitly committed to honor. Each of those thousand small decisions was made by someone. None of those decisions was made by the people who pay the cost.

The Pew report identifies the fix. The procurement bottleneck is named. The recommendations are specific: empower Procurement, streamline the approval process, build internal dashboards that track conformance rates by department. None of these is a moonshot, and none requires a new law. It requires a budget memo that resizes Procurement for the workload the city actually asks it to carry, and a Mayor who decides this matters.


Notes, Sources, and Methodology

All quantitative claims in this article come from a single source: Bennett Midland’s 137‑page final report, City of Philadelphia Professional Services Conformance Reform, released December 12, 2025, in partnership with the Pew Charitable Trusts’ Philadelphia Research and Policy Initiative. Pew published its own write‑up of the report on March 24, 2026. The report analyzed more than 12,000 professional services contracts the city conformed between fiscal year 2020 (beginning July 2019) and January 2025. The 90% figure, the “more than a quarter” delayed five months or more, the $3.4 billion annual value of late contracts, the un‑reimbursable bridge‑loan interest, and the fall 2024 sprint that conformed more than 550 backlogged contracts and paid down more than $221 million in outstanding invoices are all from that report and Pew’s March 2026 summary, covered the same day by the Philadelphia Inquirer (Anna Orso, March 24, 2026). The “nonprofits comprise approximately 30 percent of the city’s workforce” figure and the direct quote from Cynthia Figueroa are from her April 27, 2026 commentary in the Philadelphia Citizen. The article’s earlier draft attributed the 90% to “a 2024 controller’s audit” — that was wrong. The 2024 Controller Brady audit (Sept 4, 2024) was a separate review of the special‑exemption / no‑bid rule, finding $15.1M in improperly exempt contracts and $85M in under‑encumbered contracts at DBHIDS. The report’s headline is 2,269 professional services contracts worth $3.8 billion a year in total, of which 90 percent — 2,042 contracts worth $3.4 billion — were conformed late. The article uses the $3.4 billion, which is the late‑contract figure.

The report’s data covers fiscal year 2020 (beginning July 2019) through January 2025. The 90% figure is restricted to professional services contracts, not all city procurement — construction, goods, and other categories are not covered. CAO Camille A. Duchaussée’s “operational gaps” quote and the city’s commitment to “strengthening our contracting practices” are from the Inquirer. The Procurement Department capacity finding comes from the December 2025 final report itself, which describes the department as “a chronically understaffed department (relative to its responsibilities)” and recommends redefining and resourcing it to lead professional services contracting. Pew’s “Managing the High Volume of Contracts” brief (May 28, 2026) covers contract volume and start‑date timing. Pew’s “Reducing Contracting Delays” brief covers the specific recommendations, including the internal dashboards for city leaders and department heads.

The article’s interpretive claims — that the 90% functions as a tax on small nonprofits, that the system asks the smallest actors to bankroll the largest, and that the categories that can least afford the wait are the ones that keep working while the paperwork catches up — are mine, not Pew’s. Pew describes a pattern of “operational gaps” accumulated over years, not a deliberate policy. Pew’s own category‑level finding is narrower than a reader might expect: the report finds that the delays are widespread and cannot be attributed to a single department, and that the driver is contract volume and timing rather than the kind of service being bought.